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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This matter comes before the Court on a certification of questions of law by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This Court issued an Order of Acceptance
on October 31, 2007 accepting the questions certified to it. The Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(1).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act confer to state officers an
immunity from suit (immediately appealable) or merely an immunity from liability (not
immediately appealable)?
When a federal court certifies questions of state law, the Utah Supreme Court
answers the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying dispute. In re Kunz,
2004 UT 71, If 1, 8, 99 P.3d 793.
2. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act require that a Notice of Claim
against state officials in their individual capacity expressly aver "fraud" or "malice"?
When a federal court certifies questions of state law, the Utah Supreme Court
answers the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying dispute. In re Kunz,
2004 UT 71, H 1, 8, 99 P.3d 793.
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition
of this appeal:
Utah Code § 63-30-3 (2000) (see Addendum 1).
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Utah Code § 63-30-4 (2000) (see Addendum 2).
Utah Code § 63-30-11 (2000) (see Addendum 3).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of alleged violations of Appellee's civil rights and
intentional torts against her during a traffic stop in February of 2003. In January 2004, Ms.
Mecham filed a Notice of Claim, as required by Utah law, with the appropriate state officials
for various intentional torts including battery, abuse of process, assault, malicious
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Mecham eventually filed
a complaint in federal court alleging the common law causes of action and violations of her
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Citing Rule 12(b)(6), defendants moved for dismissal of the common law tort
claims pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA). See U.C.A. § 63-30-1 et
seq. The district court disregarded the defendants' argument that the Notice of Claim was
defective and allowed Ms. Mecham to amend her complaint. Defendants then moved under
Rule 12(b)(1) for dismissal for alleged defect in the Notice of Claim under Utah Code
Annotated § 63-30-4(4) (2000). On October 7, 2004, the district court denied this motion.
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on November 2, 2004. In an opinion dated
September 11, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified two
questions of state law to this Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 23,2003, Ms. Mecham, the Plaintiff/Appellee, was pulled

over by Defendant/Appellant Frazier for driving five miles per hour over the speed limit and
for failing to wear her seatbelt. Aplt. App. at 11 -12.
2.

During the traffic stop, Appellant Frazier was informed by dispatch that

Ms. Mecham's Arizona driver's license was suspended. Id. Since she had only recently been
pulled over and been informed that her license was valid, she became fearful that the officer
was using a ruse to get her out of her car. Id. Appellant Frazier continued to demand that
Ms. Mecham get out of her car and became angry when she refused to comply. Id.
3.

After he called a tow truck, Defendant Frazier demanded that Ms.

Mecham get out of her car and when she refused he immediately sprayed her in the face with
pepper spray. Id. at 12 -13. He then violently dragged her out of the car, threw her to the
ground, wrenched her arms behind her back, and handcuffed her. Id.
4.

Ms. Mecham timely filed a Notice of Claim with the Utah Attorney

General and other officials as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 33 36. The Appellants do not dispute that the Notice of Claim was timely filed and filed with
the correct officials. Id. at 92.
5.

After filing her initial Complaint, the Defendants moved to dismiss

pursuant to 12(b)(6), the Court granted the Motion but gave Ms. Mecham an opportunity to
amend her complaint. Aplt. App. at 2. Ms. Mecham filed her Amended Complaint on July
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20, 2004. Aplt. App. at 3. Defendants then moved the district court to dismiss again
pursuant to 12(b)(1). Id, The motion was denied at hearing on September 16,2004. Id, The
Appellants filed a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit which certified two questions of state law to this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
In Point I, the Appellee contends that the Utah Legislature has waived
immunity from suit for government employees where a claim is brought against them in their
individual capacities pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-4. That
section states that a civil action against the individual employee is the exclusive remedy for
injuries where it is "established" that the state employee acted or failed to act due to "fraud"
or "malice." By making civil suit the exclusive remedy and requiring a claimant to
"establish" that the state employee's action was due to fraud or malice, the legislature waived
immunity from suit that was generally granted to state employees in § 63-30-3 (2000). In
response to the first question certified to it, the Court should answer that the Utah legislature
has waived immunity from suit for state employees sued in their individual capacities.
POINT II
In Point II, the Appellee contends that the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
has never required a claimant to specifically plead "malice" or "fraud" in her notice of claim.
Using accepted standards of statutory construction, the Court should find that plain language
of Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11 (2000) does not require specific pleading of "malice"
-4-

where the claim is against an individual employee. Utah courts have repeatedly ruled that
strict compliance with § 63-30-11 is all that is required for claimants in filing their notice of
claim. The strict compliance standard is a two-way street in that the claimant does not have
to provide information or perform beyond the plain meaning of § 63-30-11. In response to
the second question certified to it, the Court should answer that the Governmental Immunity
Act did not require a claimant to expressly aver "fraud" or "malice" in a notice of claim.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD RULE THAT THE UTAH LEGISLATURE
WAIVED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT FOR EMPLOYEES SUED IN
THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 63-30-4 (2000).
Relying on established rules of statutory construction the Court must find that
the Utah legislature has waived immunity from suit for state officials sued in their individual
capacities pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-4 (2000). Following accepted rules of statutory
interpretation, the Court must find that the specific requirements of § 63-30-4 (3) and (4)
waive the general immunity from suit granted to the State in § 63-30-3.
A. When Considering Two Conflicting Statutory Provisions, the Specific
Provision Governs Over the General Provision. When interpreting statutory provisions,
a court must determine legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is the
plain language of the statute. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT
18, f 30, 974 P.2d 1194,1203. The courts presume that the legislature used each particular
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word advisedly, and give effect to each word according to its commonly accepted meaning.
Versluis v. Guar. Nafl Cos., 842 P.2d 865,867 (Utah 1992). It is a general tenet of statutory
construction that "[W]hen two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision
more specific in operation governs over the more general provision." Thomas v. Color
Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, f 9, 84 P.3d 1201.
B. The Legislature Waived The General Immunity From Suit By Making
Civil Suit Against Individual Employees The Exclusive Remedy In § 63-30-4(3). The
Utah legislature has granted the State and its employees a general immunity from suit in Utah
Code Annotated § 63-30-3 (2000). However, the legislature expressly acknowledged that the
general grant of immunity from suit is waived under certain circumstances. In Utah Code
Annotated § 63-30-4(1 )(b), it states:
If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter; consent to be sued is
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were
a private person.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(1 )(b) (2000) (emphasis added). By making civil suit the
exclusive remedy, the Legislature waived immunity from suit for employees in their
individual capacities in § 63-30-4(3):
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action under this chapter
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or
omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive
remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding
based upon the same subject matter against an employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
-6-

(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) (2000). The exception to the general rule that employees
may not be sued as individuals is where the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or
malice. This interpretation makes sense, because where the employee acts due to either of
these motivations, he or she no longer acts within the scope of their employment with the
State and the State would no longer be liable for their actions. Waiving the immunity for suit
for employees in these circumstances also denies sovereign immunity from those state
employees who would use the power of the State to injure or defraud its citizens. The Court
should interpret § 63-30-4(3) as a waiver of the general immunity from suit for employees
who act due to fraud or malice.
C. In § 63-30-4(4), The Legislature Waived Immunity From Suit By
Requiring A Claimant To "Establish" That The Individual Employee Acted Through
"Fraud" or "Malice." Even though the Legislature made a general grant of immunity from
suit in § 63-30-3, the provisions of § 63-30-4(4) constitute a specific waiver of that immunity
by requiring that allegations of fraud or malice be "established" or rendered to a verdict.
Section 63-30-4(4) reads:
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which
the government entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that:
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice;
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U.C.A. § 63-30-4(4) (2000) (emphasis added). As noted above, the grant of immunity from
suit in § 63-30-3 is a broad, general provision applicable to the "all governmental entities."
U.C.A. § 63-3-3(1). In the following section, however, the Legislature expressly states that
the chapter may provide waivers or exceptions to the general immunity from suit. U.C.A.
§ 63-3-4-(l)(b) ("If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is
granted, . . . . Id.). The Legislature continues in § 63-30-4, setting out a waiver of the
general immunity from suit by requiring that fraud or malice be "established" for claims
against individual employees. Of course, it is impossible for a claimant to "establish" that
the employee "acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice," without bringing suit and
obtaining some sort of finding by a court to that effect. U.C.A. § 63-30-4(4). By using the
word "established," the legislature signaled its intent to allow suits against individual
employees to proceed. If a verdict or capitulation resulted on the issue of fraud or malice,
then the employee became individually liable.
D. Finding That § 63-30-4 Governs Over § 63-30-3 Harmonizes The Two
Provisions And Gives Each Of Them Effect. Even though the Governmental Immunity
Act generally grants immunity from suit in § 63-30-3, if the Court were to apply that rule to
§ 63-30-4(4), the general rule would eviscerate the specific waiver of immunity for
individual employees. To harmonize the to provisions and give each effect, the Court must
find that § 63-30-4(3) and (4) constitute a specific waiver of the general immunity from suit
found in § 63-30-3. This rule preserves the general immunity granted to the State and gives
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effect to the specific waiver where an employee acts with fraud or malice. Thus both
provisions are rendered meaningful and effective and upholds the legislature's intent to allow
individual employees to be sued where they act with fraud or malice.
POINT II
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT DID NOT REQUIRE EXPRESS PLEADING OF THE
WORDS "MALICE" OR "FRAUD" IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM.
A. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Has Never Required That a
Claimant Specifically State "Malice" or "Fraud" in the Notice of
Claim.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, encoded at Utah Code Annotated §
63-30-11, has never required a claimant to expressly plead "malice" or "fraud" in her notice
of claim. When interpreting statutory provisions, a court must determine legislative intent,
and the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Craftsman
Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, \ 30, 974 P.2d 1194, 1203. The
courts presume that the legislature used each particular word advisedly, and give effect to
each word according to its commonly accepted meaning. Versluis v. Guar. Natl Cos., 842
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). In determining whether a notice of claim required by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act meets the statutory requirements, the courts must view the
notice in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427,432 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (when considering defendants' motion to dismiss all facts are viewed in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff and defendants' actions may be "construed to rise to the level
of malice." Id.)
-9-

Section 63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act) contained
all of the requirements for the Notice of Claim.1 The Act required that the notice set forth
the following:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a) (2000). Noticeably, the plain language of 63-30-11 did not require
that the notice of claim delineate between negligence and intentional torts. It did not require
different elements when the claims are being made against individual employees and the
State of Utah. The plain language of the statute did not require the use of "malice" or
"fraud" when the claimant is suing an individual employee. It is little surprise then that
section 63-30-11 has been strictly construed by the Utah courts which have declined to heap
on additional requirements beyond what the Legislature required.
B. "Malice" Need Not Be Expressly Pleaded in a Notice of Claim - Baker
v. Angus. In Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals
ruled that a claimant's allegations were sufficient under the Act where the facts alleged, if
proven, would establish that the individual employees acted with malice. In Baker, the
plaintiffs, Bill and Patricia Baker had placed their troubled teenage daughter Amy Baker in
the custody of the Utah Division of Family Services (DFS). Id. at 429. While in custody,

1

Section 63-30-11 has been amended several times since Ms. Mecham was required
to file her notice in February, 2004. A copy of the provision is included as Addendum 3.
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Amy had a tumultuous experience which culminated in her being admitted to a local hospital
and her parents being informed that she had been raped. Id. The Bakers sued under § 1983
and state law claims for "intentional, malicious, deliberately indifferent and/or grossly
negligent deprivation of Amy Baker's substantive rights to reasonable and adequate
conditions of confinement, care and treatment." Id. The defendants made a Motion to
Dismiss, which was granted by the trial court. The trial court concluded that the claims were
barred by the notice requirements of the Act. Id.
On appeal, the Bakers contended that they had "sufficiently pleaded that the
state defendants in their individual capacities as opposed to their official capacities, acted
maliciously so as to exempt application of the Government Immunity Act." Id. at 432. The
Utah Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the allegations "when viewed in a light most
favorable to the Bakers, allege[d] several instances in which the state defendant's] . . .
actions could be construed to rise to the level of malice." Id. The Court of Appeals found
that the Bakers satisfied the Notice requirement by alleging that the individual employee
threatened to terminate state care for Amy if the parents investigated, that the employee did
not report a suicide attempt by Amy and seemed hostile, and that the employee told others
that Amy was lying about being raped. Id.
Like the notice of claim in Baker v. Angus\ Ms. Mecham' s Notice alleges facts
such that, if proven, would establish that the Appellants acted with malice in spraying her in
the eyes with pepper spray, assaulting her, and maliciously prosecuting her. Ms. Mecham's
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Notice describes how she was pulled over and found to have a suspended driver's license.
Aplt. App. 34. It further alleges that Ms. Mecham feared for her safety after the Trooper told
her that her license was suspended and that he was going to have her car towed and
impounded. Id. It describes how Ms. Mecham's mother called her during her conversation
with Trooper Frazier to check on her. Trooper Frazier ordered her to put the phone down and
when she did not comply he walked back to his car. Id. The Notice details how Trooper
Frazier returned to her car sometime later and demanded that she get out so that it could be
towed. Aplt. App. at 35. Ms. Mecham was still afraid and asked Trooper Frazier to speak
with her mother on the phone to explain what was going on. Trooper Frazier refused and
sprayed her in the eyes and face with pepper spray. He then violently dragged her out of the
car, and threw her to the pavement. The Notice alleges as follows:
Troopers Frazier and Johnson unreasonably arrested Ms. Mecham which
constituted an unreasonable seizure of her person in violation of the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also committed the civil
torts of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Ms. Mecham alleges
that the troopers' actions were unreasonable and were calculated to physically
injure, intimidate, and terrorize her.
Aplt. App. 35. Conduct "calculated to physically injure intimidate, and terrorize "is clearly
due to malice. Such conduct is unquestionably "a wrongful act intentionally done without
cause or excuse."
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There can be no doubt that if Ms. Mecham can prove the facts as alleged in the
Notice, that she can establish that the Troopers acted with malice toward her. That is all the
Act required.
C. The Utah Court of Appeals Has Declined To Impose Additional
Requirements Beyond The Plain Language of § 63-30-1L The Utah Court of Appeals
has strictly construed § 63-30-11 in determining when the form and contents of a Notice of
Claim meet the statutory requirements. Even though the strict compliance standard often
favors the State or its employees, it is not a one-way street. "A claimant is not required to
do more than the Act plainly requires." Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, f9. A notice is
sufficient

so long as it complies with the plain language of the Act. Id.
In Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, 100 P.3d 254, 257, the Utah Court

of Appeals held that strict compliance with the Act did not require a claimant's notice of
claim to contain more than the plain elements in § 63-30-11. Id. at ff 9-10. In Peeples, the
plaintiff sued for injuries she suffered after falling on an icy sidewalk outside a state owned
liquor store. Id. at f 2. She timely filed a notice of claim with the Utah Attorney General but
failed to identify the liquor store in question, either by address or in any other manner. Id.
at f 4. After Ms. Peeples brought suit, the State moved to dismiss under 12(b)(6) contending
that Ms. Peeples' notice did not contain a sufficient "brief statement of the facts" as required
by § 63-30-11. Id. at f 5. The trial court dismissed the claim because the notice of claim
failed to list the address of the liquor store and thus failed to comply with the § 63-30-11.
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The Utah Court of Appeals reversed, holding that one sentence from the notice was sufficient
as a "brief statement of the facts" - "On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a
Utah State Liquor Store on ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a
poorly designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather that underneath
it." Id. at f 10. The court found that this statement strictly complied with the requirements
of the Act. The also noted that the notice of claim requirement does not bar a claim simply
because the state would like more information than the Act requires. Regarding alleged
defects or omissions in the Notice of Claim, the court stated:
As such, factual notice under the Act need not "meet the
standards required to state a claim for relief," and factual defects
in the notice will not bar a claim so long as the claim gives
"general notice of an intent to sue."
Id. at <J 11 quoting Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983).
Hence, a notice of claim which strictly complies with the requirements of § 63-30-1 land
which provides "a general notice of an intent to sue" is sufficient to satisfy the Act.
Likewise, in Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), the Utah Court of
Appeals also considered the sufficiency of a Notice of Claim and ruled that the notice
satisfied the act where it advised the State of the key facts, the nature of the claims, and the
identity of the parties.
In her Notice of Claim, Ms. Mecham complied with all of the requirements
of § 63-30-11 including a brief statement of the facts, the nature of the claims asserted, and
a description of the damages she suffered. Aplt. App. at 33 - 36. In fact, considering the
-14-

ruling in Peeples, the Notice exceeds the requirements of § 63-30-11 by describing the exact
location, date and time of the incident, and by listing the citation and criminal case number.
Aplt. App. at 33. The Notice gives a thorough factual account of the incident comprising at
least one page of single-spaced typewritten text describing the conduct of the troopers and
the surrounding circumstances. Aplt. App. at 34-35. The Notice also gives a detailed list of
claims being asserted which reads as follows:
This claim is for the torts of assault, battery, intentional affliction of
emotional distress, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious
prosecution against Trooper Sean D. Frazier and Trooper David L.
Johnson.
Aplt. App. 33. Under the heading "Specific Allegations of Misconduct and Negligence," all
of the above intentional torts are again listed with the allegation that, "Ms. Mecham alleges
that the troopers' actions were unreasonable and were calculated to physically injure,
intimidate, and terrorize her."2 Aplt. App. at 35. Finally, the Notice sets forth a description
of Ms. Mecham's injuries so far as they were known at the time. Aplt. App. at 35 - 36. Ms.
Mecham's Notice of Claim met or exceeded the requirements of §63-30-11 in every respect.
Without question, it gave "general notice of an intent to sue," as required by the rule in
Peeples. Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, 111.
D. Straley v. Halliday Is Readily Distinguishable. Before the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Appellants' sole contention was that the rule in Straley v. Halliday,

2

While the Notice also alleges negligence on the part of the troopers, Ms. Mecham
determined that she would not pursue those claims when she filed her Complaint.
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2000 UT App 38, 997 P.2d 338 requires claimants to provide information beyond the plain
language of § 63-30-11, when bringing claims against individual employees. Not only is this
a tortured reading of the holding in that case, but, the facts in that case are readily
distinguishable from the facts here. The plaintiff in Straley, acting pro se, filed two notices
of claim: the first failed to allege acts which constituted malice,3 the second notice alleged
malice but was untimely and was not filed with the Attorney General as required by the Act.
Straley, 997 P.2d at 342, note 3 at 340. The trial court dismissed Straley's Amended
Complaint, finding that he had failed to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act. Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed ruling that, the variance between the notice of claim and
the Amended Complaint was more than a simple expansion of what was alleged in the notice
and affirmed the dismissal. Id.
In the present case, unlike the plaintiff in Straley, Ms. Mecham has not
conceded that her timely filed notice is defective in any manner. By the same token, the
Appellants have not contended that the notice was substantially different from the allegations
in the complaint except that the word "malice" is not expressly used. The allegations in Ms.
Mecham's Notice of malicious conduct, calculated to injure, intimidate, and terrorize are
consistent with the allegations brought forth in the Amended Complaint. Aplt. App. 33-36;

3

The insufficiency of the notice in Straley was acknowledged by the claimant and, in
fact, was the impetus for sending the second notice. Straley v. Halliday, 997 P.2d at 340 - 41.
-16-

10-18. If proven, the allegations in her Notice of Claim and in the Amended Complaint
would establish that the troopers acted with malice.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Court should answer the first certified question that the
Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity from suit for individual employees pursuant
to § 63-30-4. With regard to the second question, this Court should answer in the negative
- that the Governmental Immunity Act, encoded in § 63-30-11, does not require a claimant
to expressly aver "fraud" or "malice" in her notice of claim.

DATED AND SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 2008

ory B Mattson,
Attorney for Appellee

ADDENDUM

Utah Code § 63-30-3 (2000) (see Addendum 1).
Utah Code § 63-30-4 (2000) (see Addendum 2).
Utah Code § 63-30-11 (2000) (see Addendum 3).
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63-30-3. I m m u n i t y of governmental entities from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following
state medical programs and services performed at a
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to
the core of governmental activity in this state and are
considered to be governmental functions:
(I) care of a patient referred by another hospital or
physician because of the high risk nature of the
patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical
facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a
state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope
of their employment that a court finds is unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity in this
state,
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title
62A, Chapter 4a.
1991
63-30-4.

Act provisions not construed as admission or
denial of liability — Effect of w a i v e r of immunity — Exclusive remedy — J o i n d e r of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as an admission or
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental
entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict
liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that
occurs during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter

7

against the employee or the estate of the employee wh
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act throi
fraud or malice; or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the con
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3 )(c).
(4) An employee may be joined in an action againsl
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act
omission complained of is one for which the governmen
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held persona
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performai
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,
under color of authority, unless it is established t h a t t
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
l
63-30-5.

Waiver of immunity a s to contractual oblig
tions.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to t
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-S
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Wat
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapt
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver ti
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other n a t u i
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in tl
amount of available water.
19
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to a c t i o n s i n v o l v i i
property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waiv<
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for tl
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to forecloi
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any adven
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any moi
gage or other lien said entity may have or claim on tl
property involved.
1»
63-30-7.

Repealed.

la

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury c a u s e d b y d<
fective, unsafe, or dangerous c o n d i t i o n <
h i g h w a y s , bridges, or other structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of t h e exceptior
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit (
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, roa<
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridg<
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
19S
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from d a n g e r o u
or defective public building, structure, o
other public improvement — Exception.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exception
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit c
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused fron
a dangerous or defective condition of any public building
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement.
199
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury c a u s e d h]
negligent act or omission of e m p l o y e e — Ex
ceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waivec
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission o
an employee committed within the scope of employmen
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or result*
from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exer
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or noi
the discretion is abused;
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63-30-3. I m m u n i t y of g o v e r n m e n t a l entities from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following
state medical programs and services performed at a
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to
the core of governmental activity in this state and are
considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or
physician because of the high risk nature of the
patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical
facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a
state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope
of their employment that a court finds is unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity in this
state,
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title
* 62A, Chapter 4a.
1991
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as an admission or
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental
entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict
liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that
occurs during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter

against the employee or the estate of the employee \
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act thi
fraud or malice; or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the c
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c).
(4) An employee may be joined in an action agair
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the a
omission complained of is one for which the governm<
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held persoi
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the perform
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employ men
under color of authority, unless it is established that
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obi
tions.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entitiei
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising oi
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Wi
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water fror
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chaj
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natt
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in
amount of available water.
]
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involvi
property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is wah
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for i
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to forecL
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any adve
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mc
gage or other lien said entity may have or claim on t
property involved.
l
63-30-7. Repealed.

i«

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury c a u s e d by c
fective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
highways, bridges, or other structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptio
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused 03
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, ros
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, brid|
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
is
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangeroi
or defective public building, structure, «
other public improvement — Exception.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptioi
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused fro
a dangerous or defective condition of any public buildin
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement,
lfr
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused b
negligent act or omission of employee — Ei
ceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waive
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission <
an employee committed within the scope of employmer
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or result
from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exei
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or nc
the discretion is abused;
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(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil
rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not
it is negligent or intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in connection with an
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management
or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or
natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or
storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section
41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located
on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
public improvement;
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter
5a dr Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition
to all other immunities granted by law.
1996
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private
property without compensation.
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
1991

63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405
and 63-2-802.

63-30-

Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subs
tion (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petit]
for review under Section 63-2-404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related t(
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be broug
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or ir
subsequent action.
u
63-30-11.

C l a i m for i n j u r y — Notice — C o n t e n t s
S e r v i c e — Legal disability [Effective u n
July 1, 2001].
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations t h
would apply if the claim were against a private person begii
to run.
>. •»
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a gover
mental entity, or against its employee for an act or omissk
occurring during the performance of the employee's dutie
within the scope of employment, or under color of authorii
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity befoi
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not tr
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as govern
mental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far a
they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or tha
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian
and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town Recorder, when t h e claim i,
against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is agains
a county;
(C) the superintendent or business adminis
trator of the board, when the claim is against i
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board
when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, when
the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian a t t h e
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental
entity, the court may extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension t h a t
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
1998

Claim for injury — Notice — C o n t e n t s —
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of
guardian ad litem [Effective July 1, 2001].
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations t h a t
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins
to run.

\6) Any person navmg a ciaim ion injury against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(1) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted, and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
person's agent,' attorney, parent, or legal guardian,
and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is
against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against
a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board,
when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, when
the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental
entity, the court may extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
(d) (i) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to
result in a claim against a governmental entity is
sustained by a potential claimant described in Subsection (4)(a), that government entity may file a
request with the court for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the potential claimant.
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this
Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim under
Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins when the
order appointing the guardian is issued.
2000
63-30-12.

Claim against state or its employee — Time
for filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act
or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within t h e scope of employment, or under CO\OT of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1998

b^-^u-i«i.

i^iaim a g a i n s t political s u b d i v i s i o n o r i t s emp l o y e e — T i m e for filing n o t i c e .
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing body of the political subdivision according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of
t\me granted \mder Section 6S-S0-11, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
1998
63-30-14.

C l a i m for injury — A p p r o v a l or d e n i a l b y
g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y or i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r
within ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify t h e
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier h a s
failed to approve or deny the claim.
1965
63-30-15.

D e n i a l of claim for injury — A u t h o r i t y a n d
t i m e for filing a c t i o n a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a l
entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action
in the district court against the governmental entity or a n
employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
1987
63-30-16.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o v e r actions —
A p p l i c a t i o n of R u l e s of Civil Procedure.
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter.
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried
as a small claims action and shall be governed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent they are consistent with
this chapter.
1999

63-30-17. V e n u e of a c t i o n s .
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose, or m the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the
political subdivision is located or in the county in which t h e
claim arose.
1983
63-30-18. Compromise and s e t t l e m e n t of actions.
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer,
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or
other relief sought.
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative
Services may:
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less
in damages filed against t h e state for which the Risk
Management Fund may be liable;
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his
representative and the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and

